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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
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GENERAL



2. Britain will advise Turkey to plan with Yugoslavia on military basis:



The British Ambassador in Ankara has been instructed to inform the Turkish Government that the only guidance that can be given at this stage about cooperation with Yugoslavia is for Greece and Turkey to go as far as possible "on a purely military basis." He is to add that the United States, Britain and France do not favor encouraging Yugoslavia to join NATO at this time, and that they would like more details on the Turkish suggestion of a "regional combination."

3. Murphy reports possible Soviet overtures toward Japan:

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[REDACTED] Recent Soviet gestures toward Japan may be an attempt to encourage the establishment of Soviet-Japanese relations, according to Ambassador Murphy. He believes that such moves as a reported Soviet approach on resumption of Japanese fishing off Kamchatka, Chinese offers of trade and repatriation, and the transmission of an increasing number of letters from Japanese detained in the USSR may be designed to convince the Japanese people that their government's policy is in error.

Murphy notes that Japan considers Soviet failure to recognize its fishing rights in the North Pacific and to repatriate Japanese POW's impediments to the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Comment: In late 1951 and early 1952, the Soviet Union made a series of friendly gestures toward the Japanese people. Japanese officials believe that a formal approach by the Soviet Mission last month on a minor shipwreck case may also have been an attempt to establish de facto relations.

SOVIET UNION

4. Moscow "conspiracy" seen as prelude to tightened security:

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[REDACTED] The British Foreign Office conjectures that the charges of a conspiracy among Soviet doctors are a warning that internal security is to be tightened. It also speculates that the security apparatus may undergo a purge, perhaps at Beria's expense, although there is no evidence as yet of a conflict between him and Malenkov. The Foreign Office believes that Soviet foreign policy is not involved, and does not consider that the anti-Jewish aspect is of predominant importance.

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A leading West German expert on the Soviet Union feels that anti-Semitic aspects of recent developments in the Orbit stem from Stalin's distrust of Jewish Communists as internationally-minded idealists with contacts in the non-Communist world.

The American Embassy in Moscow points out that Beria was listed in his customary fourth place position in Stalin's party at the Bolshoi Theatre on 12 January.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. British officials in the Sudan believe Egypt not interested in settlement:

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British officials in the Sudanese Government believe Egypt is not interested in a settlement of the Sudan issue, preferring unrest there as a way of strengthening its future position in the area.

This belief, according to the American Liaison Officer in Khartoum, is also held by the French representative, who feels that unrest in the Sudan tends to raise Egyptian cotton prices.

Comment: This is a plausible interpretation of Egyptian tactics on the Sudan, but there is no evidence that General Nagib is approaching the problem in this manner. London's acceptance of such an interpretation, however, would harden its attitude against any further compromise.

WESTERN EUROPE

6. Rome reportedly anxious to station Italian troops in Trieste:

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The "necessity" for having Italian troops enter Trieste as a step toward Italy's gaining control of the Zone A administration, without

prejudicing its claims to Zone B, is being emphasized by an influential Italian newspaper and by the Trieste press. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] this demand is generally accepted in Trieste as the new policy of the Rome government.

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Comment: The Italian Government, anxious to strengthen its position in the forthcoming elections, wishes to give the electorate evidence of concrete progress toward recovery of the Free Territory. It may be preparing to request either that Italian troops enter Trieste or that Italy receive some other recognition of its "sovereignty" over the territory.

7. Negotiations with Denmark for airbase rights seen doomed:

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[REDACTED] Ambassador Anderson reports that further negotiations concerning airbase rights for American units in Denmark are "probably doomed to failure," since the necessary Social Democratic support seems most unlikely.

The chairman of the Social Democratic Party has stated that in view of the special election on 21 April for a constituent assembly, negotiations cannot proceed now. If he were assured that the US Air Force units would not be withdrawn without Danish consent--an assurance he considers "impossible" to obtain--he would support a parliamentary resolution authorizing negotiations.

Comment: Without Social Democratic support the minority government would be reluctant, and might find it parliamen-
tarily impossible, to proceed with airfield negotiations. Social Demo-
cratic leaders apparently feel that neutralism and pacificism have
again reached serious proportions within their party, and that they must
recognize this or suffer serious electoral losses.